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C O N F I D E N T I A L LUXEMBOURG 000267

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/EX VAL BELON; IO/PDAS GERALD ANDERSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2019

TAGS: [PREL](#) [UNGA](#) [PGOV](#) [LU](#)

SUBJECT: LUXEMBOURG: DEMARCHE DELIVERED - UNGA WALKOUT

REF: SECSTATE 97566

Classified By: Charge d'affaires Mark Biedlingmaier, Reasons 1.4(b)(d)

¶1. (U) Charge d'affaires and POL/ECON Counselor Michael Via delivered substance of demarche to Eric Muller, (Acting) MFA Political Director, in the absence of Georges Frieden who has accompanied Foreign Minister Asselborn to New York.

¶2. (C) Muller clearly understood the intent of the message and noted that the proposed redlines were "common themes" often propagated in diatribes delivered by Iran and Libya. He assured EMBOFFs that Luxembourg would certainly not/not block consensus within the European Union discussion of the matter, and instead, support a decision to walk-out. The conversation then turned toward a discussion of similar instances and protests in recent memory which had taken place either at the United Nations in New York or UN Mission to its International Organizations in Geneva.

¶3. (C) Muller stated that Asselborn would be contacted in New York at opening of business today (Monday, September 21) to relay the demarche redlines. (Note: During a working lunch with Asselborn on September 11, and again during the September 17 visit of Special Envoy for Guantanamo Dan Fried, the Foreign Minister noted to Charge d'affaires that Luxembourg would strongly support Iranian sanctions "in the normal course of diplomacy" should the United States decide to take this course of action. In addition, Asselborn professed to have influence on this matter with close friend and Socialist ally, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, and potentially, with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. To capture Russia's support, however, Asselborn indicated that the U.S. would need to demonstrate some "flexibility" on the Ballistic Missile Shield issue, ref: Poland and the Czech Republic, and by easing its focus on the break-away Republics in the Caucasus region. Subsequently, Asselborn applauded the President's September 17 announcement on BMS, and in local press accounts, felt that significant progress could be made on other regional issues during UNGA.)

¶4. (U) If further analysis is required, please contact POL/ECON Counselor Michael Via.

BIEDLINGMAIER